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I.   INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Legal Voice is a regional non-profit public interest organization 
that works to advance the legal rights of all women in the Pacific 
Northwest through litigation, legislative advocacy, and legal rights 
education. Since its founding in 1978 (as the Northwest Women’s Law 
Center), Legal Voice has been at the forefront of efforts to combat sex 
discrimination. Legal Voice has participated as counsel and as amicus 
curiae in cases throughout the Northwest and the country involving gender 
discrimination, including sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the 
workplace, educational settings, and in public accommodations, including 
serving as counsel in one of the few Washington Supreme Court cases 
involving a claim of sex discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation, Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. 
Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 59 P.3d 655 
(2002). Legal Voice serves as a regional expert advocating for legislation 
and for robust interpretation and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws 
to protect women and gender-nonconforming people.  Legal Voice has a 
strong interest in ensuring that the Washington Law Against 
Discrimination is interpreted to protect against sexual, gender-based, and 
other forms of harassment, including in public accommodations. 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
(“Korematsu Center”) is a nonprofit organization based at Seattle 
 
 2 
University School of Law and works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing 
the legacy of Fred Korematsu who defied military orders during World 
War II that led to the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and later 
became an advocate for civil rights of others who are victims of 
discrimination. The Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring 
that effective remedies exist to address discrimination. The Korematsu 
Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of 
Seattle University. 
II.   INTRODUCTION 
Though the immediate lawsuit seeks to vindicate Appellant 
Floeting’s rights, much more is at stake here. This case – one of first 
impression under a provision of the Washington’s Law Against 
Discrimination (“WLAD”) that is rarely litigated – calls upon the Court to 
define what constitutes harassment (sex-based or otherwise) in a place of 
public accommodation and who is liable for it. If the Court adopts 
Respondent Group Health’s view of the law, the entities that open their 
doors to the public will be liable for unfair practices in only the most 
limited circumstances, leaving deprivation of civil rights in our hospitals, 
civic spaces, restaurants, and hotels unmitigated. The Court should reject 
this invitation and instead adopt a rule of liability that is appropriate to the 
public accommodation context, consistent with the plain language of the 
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WLAD, and faithful to the highest policy objectives of the Act. On the 
facts of this case, such a rule of law would leave the determination of 
whether Mr. Floeting was deprived of his civil rights in the capable hands 
of the jury.   
III.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Amici Curiae adopt the Appellant’s Statement of the Case. 
IV.   ARGUMENT 
A. The WLAD Is Construed Liberally to Effectuate the Purpose 
of the Act. 
Washington State has a long and proud tradition of being on the 
forefront of promoting civil rights. In 1949, the legislature enacted anti-
discrimination laws targeting the workplace;
1
 in 1957, it added further 
protections in places of public accommodations and publicly-assisted 
housing;
2
 and in 1973, it passed anti-discrimination laws protecting 
persons with disabilities.
3
 All of these enactments preceded similar 
provisions under the federal 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, respectively. What 
is more, Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) has a 
broader reach than analogous federal laws; for example, it protects 
women, breastfeeding mothers, and gays and lesbians from discrimination 
                                                 
1
 Laws of 1949, ch. 183, § 1. 
2
 Laws of 1957, ch. 37, §2. 
3
 Laws of 1973, ch. 141 (adding sex, marital status and age); Laws of 1973, ch, 214 
(adding disability); Laws of 2009, ch. 164 (adding breastfeeding). 
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in places of public accommodation.
4
 RCW 49.60.040; see also WAC 162-
32-040 (describing prohibited harassment based on gender 
identity/expression in place of public accommodation). 
The purpose of the WLAD is, simply stated, to deter and eradicate 
discrimination in Washington. RCW 49.60.010 (declaring that 
“discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its 
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free 
democratic state.”). The law “embodies a public policy of the highest 
priority.” Xieng v. Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington, 120 Wn.2d 512, 521, 
844 P.2d 389 (1993) (internal citation and quotation omitted).  In contrast 
to federal anti-discrimination legislation, our state statute includes express 
and emphatic language, directing the courts to construe the Act liberally to 
effectuate its purpose. RCW 49.60.020; see also Fraternal Order of 
Eagles v. Tenino Aerie No. 564, 148 Wn.2d 224, 247, 59 P.3d 655 (2002) 
(noting the statute should be liberally construed).   
In the public accommodations context, the right to be free from 
discrimination includes the right to “full enjoyment” of those services and 
privileges. RCW 49.60.030. Denial or deprivation of such a right is an 
affront to personal dignity. See Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 
Wash. 24, 31, 194 P. 813 (1921) (“The act [of discrimination] alleged in 
itself carries with it the elements of an assault upon the person, and in such 
                                                 
4
 Laws of 2006, ch. 4 (adding sexual orientation). 
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cases the personal indignity inflicted, the feeling of humiliation and 
disgrace engendered, and the consequent mental suffering, are elements of 
actual damages.”); accord Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 250, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964) (the 
“fundamental object” of laws banning discrimination in public 
accommodations is “to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that 
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.”) 
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Said another way, public 
accommodation laws serve to “eliminate the unfairness, humiliation, and 
insult of … discrimination in facilities which purport to serve the general 
public.” Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 67 
(5th Cir. 1975). 
B. Harassment Is a Form of Discrimination in a Place of Public 
Accommodation. 
There can be no serious dispute that discrimination in a place of 
public accommodation includes conduct that falls short of an outright 
denial of service, such as humiliation, harassment, or insult. See RCW 
49.60.040(14) (definition of “full enjoyment” includes the right to access 
“facilities” and “privileges” without being treated as “not welcome, 
accepted, desired, or solicited.”). Contrary to Group Health’s urging, any 
fair reading of the definition of “full enjoyment” in concert with the public 
accommodations provision (RCW 49.60.215, or “section 215”) compels 
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such a conclusion. One Washington court has already recognized as much. 
See Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114 v. Washington State Human Rights 
Comm'n, on Behalf of Johnson, 39 Wn. App. 763, 775, 695 P.2d 999 
(1985) (accepting the proposition that “a denial [of full and equal services] 
occurs when there is discriminatory or abusive treatment” and not just 
outright refusals of entry) (citing King v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 P.2d 
349, 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)).  
To conclude otherwise would mean that a barista could make 
disparaging and insulting comments toward a mother about her choice to 
breastfeed at a coffee shop and suggest she go to the toilet to do so, and no 
liability would attach so long as the salesperson does not refuse to take her 
order. Or it would permit a sales clerk to tease and humiliate a customer 
about her disability, and again, no liability would attach so long as the 
customer was not prevented from completing her transaction. Such a rule 
would ignore the chief harm resulting from discrimination that the WLAD 
was designed to guard against in the first place: the injury to an 
individual’s self-worth and integrity. See Anderson, 114 Wash. at 31; 
accord King, 656 P.2d at 352. The liberal construction of the WLAD does 
not so permit. 
Indeed, for this very reason, Washington courts have long-
recognized harassment as a form of unlawful discrimination in the 
employment context, which of course does not take the form of outright 
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exclusion from the workplace, such as a termination or failure-to-hire. See, 
e.g., Glasgow v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 406, 693 P.2d 708 
(1985) (recognizing hostile work environment as form of sex 
discrimination under WLAD); Davis v. W. One Auto. Group, 140 Wn. 
App. 449, 457, 166 P.3d 807 (2007) (recognizing claim of racially hostile 
work environment); Fisher v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 53 Wn. App. 591, 
769 P.2d 318 (1989) (same); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 43-
44, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (recognizing claim of disability-based hostile work 
environment); accord Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 
106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986) (recognizing claim of sex-based 
hostile work environment under Title VII). Likewise, harassment is 





 and health care.
7
  
                                                 
5
 Title IX has been interpreted to protect every student (and other individuals protected 
by Title IX) from sex-based harassment that limits their ability to participate in or benefit 
from the education program, or that creates a hostile or abusive educational environment. 
See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance (1997), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html. 
6
 24 C.F.R. § 100. This rule was the specific subject of recent rulemaking. See U.S. 
Housing & Urban Development Department, Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment 
Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing 
Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63054 (Sept. 14, 2016). 
7
 While the Department of Health and Human Services declined to include a separate 
harassment provision, it did unequivocally recognize that harassment was a form of 
discrimination: “OCR recognizes that various forms of harassment can impede an 
individual's ability to participate in or benefit from a health program or activity and can 
thus constitute unlawful discrimination under Section 1557 and this part. … Consistent 
with the well-established interpretation of existing civil rights laws, OCR interprets the 
final rule to prohibit all forms of unlawful harassment based on a protected 
characteristic.”  U.S. Health & Human Servs. Dep’t, Nondiscrimination in Health 




C. The Court Should Adopt a Rule of Liability for Proving 
Harassment in a Place of Accommodation That Is Consistent 
with WLAD’s Purpose to Eradicate Discrimination.  
This case presents an issue of first impression under Washington 
law: What must the plaintiff show to establish unlawful harassment in a 
place of public accommodation? 
1. The Definition of Harassment. 
Group Health urges the Court to blindly apply all elements of an 
employment discrimination claim (section 180 of RCW 49.60) for 
purposes of determining whether an entity is liable for an unfair practice in 
a place of public accommodation (section 215). Yet, the public policies 
underlying the two are distinct and, arguably, the protections are much 
broader under the latter provision. Section 215 declares it an unfair 
practice to commit an act that results “directly or indirectly” in (1) “any 
distinction, restriction, or discrimination” in a place of public 
accommodation, or (2) requires any person to pay more than the uniform 
rates charged other persons, or (3) “refus[e] or withhold[]” admission from 
any person. RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The employment provision 
has different aims altogether: it declares it an unfair practice for an 
employer to (1) “refuse to hire any person” because of her protected 
status, (2) “discharge or bar” a person from employment because of her 
protected status, (3) to discriminate in compensation or in any terms or 
conditions of employment, or (4) to, inter alia, discriminate in advertising 
for a position. RCW 49.60.180.   
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Engaging in conduct that results in “any” “distinction, restriction, 
or discrimination” in the “full enjoyment” of public accommodation 
services is simply not the same conduct that courts (and juries) have 
deemed sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of employment (e.g., 
severe or pervasive harassment). This is not to say that the decades-long 
effort of defining and refining what constitutes “harassment” in the 
workplace is meaningless. To the contrary, the pattern jury instruction for 
outlining a plaintiff’s burden of proof in the employment setting provides 
a useful starting point for the instant case. But reflect the statutory text of 
section 215 and the concept of “full enjoyment.” Amici suggest the 
following: 
To establish [his] [her] claim of harassment on the basis of 
[protected status], plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions: 
 
(1) That there was language or conduct [of a sexual nature, or 
racial nature, as appropriate]; 
 
(2) That this language or conduct was unwelcome in the sense that 
Plaintiff regarded the conduct as undesirable and offensive, and did 
not solicit or incite it; 
 
(3) That this conduct or language was so offensive or pervasive 
that it altered the conditions of (name of plaintiff's) employment 
directly or indirectly altered the plaintiff’s full enjoyment of a 
place of public accommodation; and 
 
(4) That the language or conduct was carried out by the defendant 
[or the defendant’s agent or employee, as appropriate]. 
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See 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.23 (6th ed.) 
(strike-throughs and modifications added).
8
  This articulation of the 
plaintiff’s burden balances a subjective test of what constitutes offensive 
language or conduct (element 2) with how a reasonable person would 
view such language or conduct (element 3) and requires, simply enough, 
that the plaintiff show a causal connection between the misconduct and the  
alleged deprivation or alteration of services. This rule of liability would 
not render Group Health or other entities liable for “casual, isolated, or 
trivial” remarks because the conduct or language must be offensive 
enough to directly or indirectly alter the plaintiff’s full enjoyment in a 
place of public accommodation.  
2. The Scope of Liability for Acts of Employees 
The fourth and last element suggested above identifies who can be 
held liable for the harassing conduct. Borrowing from the employment 
context, Group Health spends considerable time on a mashup of state and 
federal common law agency-related concepts, urging the Court to adopt a 
negligence standard for imputing liability to entities for the acts of their 
                                                 
8
 This burden of proof recognizes that requiring a victim of harassment to identify a 
comparator makes little sense. By contrast, where there is an allegation of disparate 
treatment in a place of public accommodation, a plaintiff may seek to prove her case 
through such evidence. See Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 508, 525, 20 




non-supervisory employees. Br. at 33-36. This argument ignores the plain 
language of the statute, which this Court cannot do.
9
  
The public accommodations provision of the WLAD imputes 
liability to entities (persons) for the acts of employees:  
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s 
agent or employee to commit an act which directly or 
indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or 
discrimination….[in a place of public accommodation].  
RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The provision is plain on its face: any 
“person” is liable for the unfair acts of his or her (or its) “employee” 
separate and apart from when those employees are acting as agents for the 
entity.
10
 Indeed, the legislature calls out the concept of agency separately, 
in the disjunctive, by using the term “agent” separate and apart from 
“employee.” Id.  No other construction of the statute is required; Group 
Health is liable for T.T.’s misconduct because, simply enough, T.T. is 
Group Health’s employee. 
There are fourteen different “unfair practices” provisions under the 
WLAD, and the legislature chose just two instances in which the acts of 
employees would be automatically imputed to the entity: (1) the public 
                                                 
9
 The starting point for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute. See 
Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002); State 
v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). If the language is plain on its face, as 
here, the Court goes no further. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 
(1994) (“Plain language does not require construction.”).  
10
 There is no dispute that Group Health is a “person,” subject to the WLAD, as it is 
broadly defined to include, inter alia, “any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent, or 
employee….” RCW 49.60.040(19). Likewise, there is no dispute that Group Health, 
because it provides medical services, qualifies as a place of public accommodation.  
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accommodations provision (section 215), quoted above, and (2) the 
provision that follows it, concerning discrimination against persons with 
disabilities who use service animals in eating establishments (section 218). 
Both use the identical imputed-liability phrase (“a person or a person’s 
agent or employee”), in stark contrast to the other dozen provisions. See, 
e.g., RCW 49.60.176 (making “any person” liable for unfair practices in 
connection with credit transactions); .178 (same as to insurance 
transactions); 180 (making any “employer” liable for employment 
discrimination);.222 (making “any person” liable in connection to real 
estate transactions);.190 (making any “labor union or labor organization” 
liable for discrimination in union membership); .200 (making any 
“employment agency” liable for discrimination); 223 (making any 
“person” liable as to rental or sale of property in a given neighborhood).  
We must presume this addition of imputed liability – in just two of 
a dozen provisions – was intentional and not by accident. Cf. In re Det. of 
Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) (presuming that the 
use of language in one provision of a statute that differs from another was 
intentional, applying “expressio unius” canon of statutory construction); 
accord Keenfe Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 
124 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 
23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983)) (reasoning that where 
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
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omits it in another, it is presumed that the legislature acts “intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).  
Group Health not does explain why this Court should look to 
agency liability principles developed in one of the fourteen “unfair 
practices” provisions (section 180) in order to construe WLAD’s public 
accommodation provision (section 215). The logic of adopting common 
law agency principles in defining the scope of employer liability for 
workplace discrimination is beyond the scope of what is presented here; 
suffice it to say that it is not an altogether clear path, albeit one that is 
well-worn. See Glasgow, 103 Wn.2d at 407 n.2 (citing federal appellate 
decisions construing Title VII as instructive for determining the elements 
of a sexual harassment claim in the employment context).
11
 And, in the 
employment context, the adoption of various agency principles is not 
without its critics and problems – namely, inconsistencies from one 
statutory framework to the next. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under 
Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 755, 757 
                                                 
11
 That is, no Washington court has articulated why the WLAD’s scope of employer 
liability should be coterminous with that under Title VII when the text of the two statutes 
differs in many respects.  Compare RCW 49.60.040(11) (definition of “employer” 
includes “any person…who employs….”) with 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (“Title VII”) 
(definition of “employer” includes “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
… and any agent of such a person…”); and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 754-55, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998) (reasoning that Congress 
intended the courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles in light of the fact 
that “employer” is defined under Title VII to include “agents.”). 
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(1999) (discussing the “puzzle of the inconsistency” for imputing liability 




The salient fact is that our legislature chose to do something 
different with respect to treatment members of the public, such as 
consumers, in places of public accommodation and with respect to those 
with service animals. Undoubtedly, this is the province of the legislature – 
to establish standards of conduct and attendant rules of liability in pursuit 
of public policy and the greater good. See, e.g., Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wn. 
App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978) (recognizing liability of tavern owner for 
harm caused by intoxicated minor, reasoning that the legislature 
proscribed certain conduct, thus establishing a duty different from that at 
common law); accord United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S. 
Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975) (recognizing congressional intent to 
impose higher standard of care on food sellers, imposing criminal liability 
even where no awareness of wrongdoing, incentivizing those in position to 
act to prevent hazards). In drafting section 215 to impute liability to the 
employer for the employee’s unfair practices, the legislature has 
incentivized companies to take proactive steps to train and supervise their 
                                                 
12
 To add to the confusion, courts acknowledge that “common-law principles may not be 
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 755 
(quoting Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 72).  But when, why, and how they apply is not 
always clear; the Court should tread carefully in looking to employment cases as 
persuasive authority.  
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rank and file employees – (i.e., the people who actually interact with the 
customers) – to ensure compliance with the law. Cf. United Park, 421 U.S. 
at 672-73. 
A plain language reading of section 215 to allow for vicarious 
liability also makes sense as applied to real world conditions. Unlike 
dealings in the workplace, most consumer interactions are fleeting. Take, 
for example, a lifeguard who levels anti-immigrant, islamophobic insults 
toward a Somali man and his hijab-wearing daughter. The most likely 
outcome is that the father will simply take his daughter elsewhere, leaving 
the lifeguard to repeat her offenses on the next Muslim family. In the very 
unlikely event the father summons the courage to complain, the very most 
he will get, according to Group Health, is an apology. Under Group 
Health’s view, the pool owner is never liable for the unquestionably unfair 
practice of its lifeguard unless she also happens to be the pool manager 
(i.e., the owner’s “agent”) or unless upper-management had notice of 
prior, similar incidents and failed to take action. Absent one of these two 
conditions, Group Health argues, no liability attaches to the owner no 
matter how offensive, degrading, or harmful the lifeguard’s conduct. Not 
only does this argument run afoul of the plain language of the imputed-
liability provision in the statute, it has the perverse effect of creating a “no 
liability” rule in the vast majority of cases: consumer encounters will 
almost always be with rank-and-file employees – clerks, salespeople, 
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receptionists, servers – and not managers. Cf. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 
207 F.3d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting strict adherence to agency 
principles in public accommodation context because “a rule that only 
actions by supervisors are imputed to the employer would result, in most 
cases, in a no liability rule.”). And it does very little if anything to 




Moreover, the Court should view any argument that adopting 
Amici’s proposed standard of liability will open the floodgates to lawsuits 
with a heavy dose of skepticism. The public accommodation provision of 
the WLAD has existed for over a half-century; and laws protecting against 
race discrimination in public accommodations go back twice as far. See 
Anderson, 114 Wash. 24. Yet, the dearth of reported cases (and indeed, the 
fact that this case presents one of first impression) reveals a very serious 
problem of under-enforcement. That is: there is no reason to believe that 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, and the like is 
any less prevalent in our theaters, pools, and coffee shops than it is in our 
workplaces, but while the latter has led to a vast body of decisional 
authority, there are by comparison almost no cases vindicating civil rights 
in places of public accommodations. The reality is, this form of 
                                                 
13
 The concern in Arguello for avoiding perverse results is equally warranted here, but 
this Court is not so constrained by the common law backdrop as the Fifth Circuit was in 
construing claims under federal civil rights statutes (section 1981 and 1983) which 
include no such statutory-imputed liability as here. 
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discrimination, however unconscionable, does not typically bring with it 
significant monetary damages. Few people will be inclined to endure the 
stress of litigation for what amounts to a moral victory (particularly by the 
time the costs of suit are paid).  And plaintiffs’ attorneys, more often than 
not paid on contingency, are unlikely to be willing to take on the risk of 
litigating such claims when the potential for recovery is effectively limited 
to fees.  
In sum, the Court should adopt a standard of liability that tracks 
the text of the statute, is faithful to Act’s purpose of eradicating 
discrimination and promoting full enjoyment in places of public 
accommodation, and one that reflects the reality of consumer-type 
transactions.   
D. Discrimination, Including Harassment, Poses Barriers to 
Accessing Health Care, with Resulting Negative Impacts on 
Public Health. 
Finally, Amici respectfully request the Court to consider the 
specific context of this case: Rev. Floeting was seeking health care 
services.  In the health care context, harassment not only can itself create 
negative health impacts, but it also can result in denial and/or impairment 
of access to care in important and harmful ways. 
Critically, sexual or other forms of harassment in health care can 
discourage people from seeking care.
14
  For example, a provider who uses 
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 When patients do not feel comfortable as a result of harassment or because of a 
provider’s perceived implicit or explicit bias, they are less likely to get comprehensive 
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derogatory language when talking to a woman who is unmarried and 
sexually active or pregnant may create a hostile environment that could 
keep her from accessing needed reproductive health care.
15
 
Discrimination in health care settings can be particularly 
pronounced when individuals identify with more than one protected class. 
For example, African American women generally receive lower quality 
medical services than White women, with disparities in early diagnosis of 
breast cancer and maternal death rates worsening in recent years.
16
  In 
addition, the percentage of women reporting that their provider did not 
listen, explain things clearly, respect what they had to say, or spend 




                                                                                                                         
medical care. See, e.g., Irene Blair et al., Clinicians’ Implicit Ethnic/Racial Bias and 
Perceptions of Care Among Black and Latino Patients, 11 Annals of Family Med. 43, 43 
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Ulene, Doctors and Nurses’ Weight Biases Harm Overweight Patients, L.A. Times 
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/13/health/la-he-the-md-weight-bias-
20101213 (discussing negative health implications of stigma and bias by providers 
against obese and overweight patients). 
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AHRQ Pub. No. 13-0003, National Healthcare Disparities Report 2012 10-5 (2013), 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr12/nhdr12_prov.pdf. 
17
 Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
AHRQ Pub. No. 12-0006-3-EF, Disparities in Healthcare Quality Among Minority 
Women: Findings from the 2011 National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Reports 6 




Along with African American and undocumented individuals, 
many transgender and gender non-conforming individuals also report 
being verbally, and sometimes physically, harassed in medical settings.
18
  
A 2010 study found that 70 percent of transgender respondents and nearly 
56 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents reported experiencing 
at least one instance of discrimination or patient profiling when attempting 
to access health services.
19
 Further, 28 percent of transgender and gender 
nonconforming individuals report facing harassment in medical settings, 
and 19 percent report being refused medical care altogether due to their 
transgender status.”
20
  The negative impacts of such discrimination are 
striking: 48 percent of transgender and gender non-conforming individuals 
report postponing seeking care when sick or injured and 50 percent report 
postponing or avoiding preventive care.”
 21 
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Patients often do not have much choice in providers or health 
systems.  Indeed, most health insurance covers care for its insured that is 
limited to a network of providers.  Thus, they are in effect a captive 
audience for services that can literally have life or death consequences. 
Because of the potentially low monetary damages involved – one 
may be tempted to diminish the significance of discriminatory conduct in 
places of public accommodation.  As this discussion about access to 
health care reveals, discrimination in the provision of services has 
implications beyond dignitary harm. Indeed, Floeting could not simply 
“shop” elsewhere for the services he needed, nor should the law require 
him to.   
V.   CONCLUSION 
Our legislature recognized long ago that the evil of discrimination 
“menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.”  
RCW 49.60.010. The Court has the opportunity to announce a standard of 
liability for what constitutes harassment in a place of accommodation and 
who is liable for such misconduct. In doing so, Amici urge the Court adopt 
a standard of liability that draws from the definition of workplace 
harassment where appropriate, but avoids the miasma of that body of law 
where it is not. To do otherwise frustrates the purpose of the Act to 
promote full participation in public life and in the marketplace, regardless 
of a person’s gender, the color of her skin, the place of her birth, the god 
she worships, the service animal by her side.   
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Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December, 2016.   
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